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Being careful what you wish for 
The case of happiness in China
Charles Stafford, London School of Economics
This article takes ethnographic material from rural China and Taiwan and relates it 
to recent theories and findings in the psychology and economics of happiness. In brief, 
psychologists suggest that humans are not on the whole very good at “affective forecasting,” 
that is, at predicting their own emotions; this is consequential when, for example, they 
pursue money in order to be happy—not realizing that having more money will probably 
not, in fact, make them happier. Drawing on ethnographic findings, I suggest that people in 
China and Taiwan are often, in fact, as concerned with predicting the emotions of others as 
in predicting their own emotions. I then consider this in relation to Chinese family projects 
where the pursuit of wealth—“for family happiness”—appears to be a shared goal, as well as 
considering families in which this shared goal has to some extent, and sometimes for very 
different reasons, been lost. 
Keywords: happiness, emotions, psychology, economics, China, Taiwan
Let me start by drawing a contrast between happiness as a motive (something I 
want) and happiness as an outcome (something I get). I may be motivated to do 
certain things—for example, buy chocolates or ask someone out on a date—be-
cause I believe or hope that these actions will lead to me being happy in some sense; 
but whether I really will be happy as a result of them is another matter, of course. 
I could accidentally buy what for me is the wrong kind of chocolate, the kind with 
pieces of orange in it, in which case I will be disappointed. As for asking someone 
on a date: even if things go well—that is, it’s not that I end up on the wrong kind of 
date—the experience may not bring me the happiness I had hoped for. The former 
case is about life going wrong. The latter (and perhaps more interesting) case is 
about life going right but still failing to live up to expectations. 
This possible disconnect between what we aim for and what we get—emotionally 
speaking—has been the focus of sustained research by psychologists, economists, 
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and others in recent years. The findings suggest, in brief, that our “affective fore-
casting” skills are very imperfect (see, e.g., Wilson and Gilbert 2005; Gilbert and 
Wilson 2009). We tend to overestimate the extent to which supposedly wonderful 
life events will make us happy and the extent to which supposedly catastrophic 
life events will make us unhappy; the same holds true, it seems, for more everyday 
kinds of good and bad experiences. There are different explanations for this phe-
nomenon, including the fact that people do not generally know much about things 
they have not yet lived through. Moreover, cognitive biases may lead them to focus 
on particular aspects of (prospective) experiences while downplaying others: for 
example, to focus on how much their friends will admire a new pair of shoes while 
ignoring what it will feel like to wear them.1 
Such findings, whatever else they may do, raise interesting questions about the 
psychological foundations of classic utilitarianism and thus of standard economics. 
It may be rational for us to pursue happiness or more generally whatever it is that 
we want —“utility”—through the means we have. But what if our predictions of 
what will make us happy (or more generally satisfied) are unreliable? In that case, 
the risk is that our actions will misfire: we may well end up with things—including 
emotions—we were not actually wishing for. 
One especially consequential version of this forecasting problem relates to the 
pursuit of wealth. When the developed Western economies in the post-World 
War II era are taken as an example, there is some truly striking evidence, assum-
ing one accepts it. Per capita income has gone up dramatically, leading to sharp 
improvements in living standards. It seems, however, that people are no happier 
on average than they were back in the 1950s (for an overview, see Layard 2005). 
Why, one might ask, have they worked so hard to get rich if the end result is no 
more happiness than they had when they started? Richard Easterlin suggests that, 
among other things, they fail to grasp how short-lived the psychological benefits 
of extra wealth will be and thus “allocate an excessive amount of time” to trying 
to get it (2003: 11176; see also Easterlin 2001). They would be better off following 
the advice of Richard Layard, an economist who embraces a version of old-school 
utilitarianism. Summing up the evidence, he concludes that happiness/wellbeing is 
a function not of wealth per se but of having strong and stable families; solid com-
munities and friendships; secure employment and income; good health; personal 
freedoms (including holding significant rights vis-à-vis government); and religious 
beliefs, or at least a guiding system of personal morality.2 He argues that we should 
allocate collective time/energy/public funds to sorting out such matters rather than 
increasing GDP. Indeed, as noted in the introduction as well as other contributions 
1. For an accessible introduction to the psychology of happiness, see Gilbert 2007. A very 
thought-provoking commentary on some of the analytical and methodological issues 
surrounding research by psychologists and economists on happiness can be found in 
Kahneman 2011: 375–407. 
2. Framing this in quantitative terms, Layard suggests that six variables “can explain 80% 
of the variation in happiness” between the fifty countries in the World Values Survey in 
four different years: the divorce rate, the unemployment rate, the level of trust, the rate 
of membership in non-religious organizations, the quality of the government, and the 
fraction of people “believing in God” (2005: 70–71). 
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to this collection, policies along these lines have gained significant traction in plac-
es as diverse as Bhutan and the United Kingdom (see Cook’s article for a detailed 
discussion of the latter case). 
 * * *
And yet most anthropologists reading this snapshot of interdisciplinary work on 
happiness are likely to have serious reservations about it, and not without reason 
(again, see the introduction, as well as the article by Freeman; see also the recent 
commentaries in Barbara Rose Johnston et al. 2012). Aside from the challenge of 
defining and measuring “happiness” in a way that will work across cultures— good 
luck with that—anthropologists will surely object to the idea that happiness can be 
assumed to be the priority for humans everywhere that it was for Jeremy Bentham. 
As the arch anti-utilitarian Marshall Sahlins once remarked, “A people”—by which 
he means irrational Westerners, and especially irrational Americans—“who con-
ceive life to be the pursuit of happiness must be chronically unhappy” (2002: 17). 
His broader point is that desires, the things we are motivated to aim for in the first 
place, are always culturally and historically constituted. 
Take the case of happiness in rural China and Taiwan. In fact, the people I have 
met there during fieldwork do indeed seem highly motivated to pursue happiness, 
pleasure, and wellbeing, and there are many Chinese terms, notions, folk sayings, 
and practices that relate explicitly to happiness in one form or another.3 Chinese 
weddings, for example, are redundantly organized around the ideal of “double hap-
piness” (shuangxi) and the “sweetness” (tianmi) that should accompany a “joyous 
event” (xishi) of this kind. Nowadays a whole industry surrounds this. And yet, in 
traditional Chinese weddings, a lack of joy was also meant to be part of the pro-
ceedings. As Throop (this collection) says of Yap, the idea that suffering and unhap-
piness, in certain circumstances, are especially virtuous is one that has a definite 
traction in China. Chinese brides (being filial daughters) were expected to be at 
least superficially miserable about separation from their natal kin via marriage, and 
thus to sit grim-faced through the accompanying rituals. In some parts of China, 
they even sang wedding laments in which their marriages were portrayed as a kind 
of death (Blake 1978; Johnson 2003). Speaking more broadly, the primary focus 
of weddings (and of the marriages they ritually instituted) was not the happiness 
or other emotional state of the bride—nor, for that matter, that of the groom. As 
Freedman explains, “The chief parties to a [traditional] marriage [were] the most 
3. Note that I have never started fieldwork with the specific aim of studying happiness or 
wellbeing, per se, nor have I asked my informants to speak directly to the question of 
happiness. Nevertheless, more general questions related to life aspirations, wellbeing, 
and personal fulfillment have been central to all of my fieldwork projects, as a result 
of which I have collected a good deal of data about what actually makes people happy/
satisfied, what they appear to enjoy in the course of life, and (to frame things nega-
tively) what it is that makes them notably unhappy, anxious, and so on. For an excellent 
(historically informed) discussion of Chinese happiness/pleasure, see Farquhar 2002. 
For recent discussions that seek to bring Chinese folk models of happiness/wellbeing 
into direct dialogue with quantitative research, see Ip 2011 and 2013. 
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senior direct agnatic ascendants of the boy and the girl [to be married]” (1979: 
263). For these elders, the emphasis was on sorting out a new affinal connection, 
one that would benefit all concerned. In short, marriage sealed a relationship be-
tween families, not individuals, and responsibilities to elders and ancestors lay at its 
core. This does not mean that happiness was a matter of indifference; but nobody 
imagined that the emotional fulfillment of the bride and groom was what it was all 
about—at least not in the traditional system. 
As is well known, however, the landscape of Chinese family life and kinship has 
changed in recent decades along with ideas concerning the emotions surrounding 
it. The best account is provided by Yunxiang Yan, who documents an increased 
focus on “private life,” and more specifically on the emotional bond between wives 
and husbands. This is reflected, for example, in the creation of private spaces, such 
as separate bedrooms in rural homes, where intimacy and marital happiness can 
be nurtured (Yan 2003: 112–39). In short, people do now appear to care about the 
bride (and the groom) being happy. 
Much more could be said about all of this, but here I simply underline two rela-
tively straightforward points, uncontroversial ones for anthropologists. Yes, one 
can say that the pursuit of happiness exists in China, but, first, many social/cultural 
particularities surround this, and these are bound to deeply shape the actual experi-
ence of happiness. Indeed, the general understanding of “being happy,” for Chinese 
people through history, must presumably have been closely linked (albeit often in 
complex and even paradoxical ways) to whatever one was meant to be doing with 
one’s life. As Sangren has shown, for example, in the traditional Chinese family/
kinship system there was a particular cultural logic to the (constructed) desires of 
individual agents, for example as when daughters sought “recognition” from the 
parents who would inevitably send them away to another family; in this context, 
happiness for married-out daughters was surely hard work (Sangren 2003). More-
over, second, the social/cultural particularities of Chinese emotional life do not ex-
ist in a historical vacuum: some of the most important of them have been seriously 
transformed in recent decades (again, as shown by Yan). 
Beyond these two points, however, I want to make a third one, and this takes me 
back to the question of affective forecasting. The examples I began this chapter with 
are about me forecasting my emotions, and possibly getting it wrong. In the case of 
Chinese weddings, however, a great deal of attention is paid to what other people 
might feel if this or that thing were to happen. (Of course, I am not suggesting this 
is unique to China: that happiness is often conceived as relational, and that it rou-
tinely entails moral responsibilities, are among the key points made by the editors 
for this collection as a whole. Note that Gardner’s article, with its discussion of the 
relational and temporal aspects of migration trajectories between Bangladesh and 
the United Kingdom, is directly relevant to the points I am raising here.) Suppose, 
for example, that a young Chinese woman ends up marrying a particular man—not 
the one she would have chosen herself. Her decision to do so and/or her acquies-
cence in it happening are likely to have been premised, at least in part, on affective 
forecasting. The elders around her may have told her what they thought and felt, 
or even just instructed her what to do. But she may also have let the unwanted 
marriage take place based on her own guess or assumption about what her parents 
will feel if prospective fiancé x (the one she likes) is chosen instead of prospective 
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fiancé y (the one they prefer). Conversely, her mother and father may disapprove 
of a particular match for their daughter on the grounds that they expect it will not 
lead to her being happy in the long term, whatever she herself may think in advance 
of it. In such cases, to reiterate, affective forecasting—which, by definition, may be 
mistaken—is relational rather than being contained within individuals; more spe-
cifically, it is intergenerational. As soon as one frames the business in this way, it be-
comes clear just how complicated it must be in practice, and thus how inadequate 
simple models of rational maximizing are for capturing real world decision mak-
ing by socially embedded agents.4 For not only do we predict what people around 
us might feel about given outcomes; we also, in many cases, explicitly manipulate 
each other on the basis of such predictions. The parents who want their daughter to 
avoid a given outcome—an unhappy marriage to the good-looking but unreliable 
x—may try to persuade her directly to do what they want, or they may threaten her, 
or they may work behind her back to undermine the love match. What they hope 
to achieve via these manipulations is a degree of intergenerational coordination: of 
attitudes, intentions, decisions, and actions. Simply put, they want her to want, or 
at to least to accept enough to act upon, what they want. And their own preferences 
for the future are based in part on their (reliable or unreliable) predictions of her 
future emotions. But what if they are wrong? 
* * *
Now let us return to the pursuit not of love but of wealth. As already noted, research 
broadly suggests that “money does not make people happy,” but the detailed find-
ings are naturally more subtle than this. It turns out that—with some important 
qualifications—people of limited means are generally made happier by moving be-
yond the strains and uncertainties imposed by poverty. In this sense, someone who 
is poor and desires money as a route to happiness is not being irrational. What is 
surprising (assuming one accepts the premises and findings of the research) is the 
point at which the link between wealth and happiness begins to tail off. There is 
much discussion of this cut-off point; but summing up the state of the field back in 
2005, Layard concluded that above about US$20,000 per year (to be more specific, 
once a country has achieved this figure for annual income per head), “higher aver-
age income is no guarantee of greater happiness” (2005: 34). Obviously, in many 
places around the world, this would even today be considered a very high income; 
but in the United Kingdom, for instance, it is only slightly above the annual pay 
for someone on the national minimum wage. In other words, most people living 
4. In this article I do not have space to engage fully with the psychological critique of 
standard economic modeling; for a very interesting cognitive anthropological contri-
bution to this critique, see Quinn 1978. Note that Quinn’s point—an absolutely cru-
cial one—is that the people she studied often use relatively simple heuristics to take 
decisions about economic life rather than engaging in probability calculations, and so 
on. Similarly, although I am noting here how “complicated” affective forecasting is in 
practice, it might also be argued that people often break through this complexity by 
using simple heuristics (e.g., for selecting husbands) that are readily available in their 
social environments. 
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (3): 25–43
Charles Stafford 30
in developed Western economies would, I think, find a happiness cut-off point of 
US$20,000 surprisingly—even astonishingly—low. 
So how does this translate to the rural Chinese and Taiwanese cases that I know 
through fieldwork? Before turning to ethnography, a few things must be noted by 
way of background. The people I have met during fieldwork have almost all had 
relatively low incomes, not only by comparison with Westerners, but also by com-
parison with their urban compatriots. If the economists of happiness are broadly 
correct, then these people might reasonably anticipate some years of increased hap-
piness, assuming their incomes continue to rise as they have (on average) done in 
recent decades.5 It is also important to stress that the pursuit of wealth is a highly 
salient topic of public discourse in both China and Taiwan—although the back-
ground to the two cases is different. In China, people are keenly aware that chasing 
money (and also power in various forms, because the two are closely interlinked) is 
a pervasive social fact at this particular historical moment and something that ev-
eryone must engage with in one form or another. Ordinary people routinely debate 
the moral and ethical implications of this reality (see, e.g., Zhang 2013). The situa-
tion in Taiwan is different. One could say that it too is a place where money chasing 
is pervasive; however, the “economic miracle” happened there some time back—
basically, a generation or more ago. Nowadays, people in Taiwan are, if anything, 
anxious that the economy has stalled and may well stall further owing to a range of 
politico-economic factors beyond their control. Moreover, whereas Taiwan used to 
be a capitalist success story posed against the economic failings of China’s commu-
nism, the mainland’s “socialist market economy” now appears to be leaving Taiwan 
in its wake. Folk discourses surrounding the pursuit of wealth have been heavily 
shaped by these historical considerations. 
The final point to note by way of background corresponds to what I have noted 
above with respect to marriage. Individuals in China/Taiwan may ponder what 
kinds of economic outcomes would bring them—as individuals—happiness, well-
being, and so on. But the ebb and flow of life is explicitly framed, much of the time, 
in relation to what other people think and feel. Crucial decisions about education, 
career paths, investments, major purchases, and so on, are routinely taken collec-
tively in some sense. And it should be noted here that collective family success or 
happiness may, of course, be invoked in ways that ultimately benefit some members 
of families over others (e.g., elder over younger generations, men over women), 
just as invoking “brotherhood” within lineages may benefit some lineage mem-
bers over others (see Watson 1985). This links back to a general Chinese ethos in 
which individuals are presumed to be morally committed to, and prepared to work 
hard for, long-term projects of advancing family prosperity, regardless of short-
term (or even long-term) personal cost (see Harrell 1985).6 But how durable is 
5. As I note at the end of this article, however, recent findings about levels of Chinese hap-
piness/wellbeing, and more broadly about happiness in developing economies, present 
a decidedly mixed, arguably “paradoxical,” picture in relation to this.
6. In his thought-provoking discussion, Harrell accepts that in comparative terms Chi-
nese people appear to work incredibly hard. This may relate to a “work ethic” into 
which they are socialized, as well as to the existence (under particular historical cir-
cumstances) of material incentives that encourage work. But Harrell concludes that 
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this commitment in practice? Is it transmitted across generations without diffi-
culty? Would it survive, for example, the kind of disillusionment that might come 
to younger generations as they learn that prosperity and material wealth do not 
(always) equate to happiness? And what if the affective forecasts on which long-
term projects of advancement are based turn out to be mistaken? 
In considering such questions, I want to draw a broad contrast between two ide-
al types of families that I will label respectively as “progressive” and “declining.” By 
the former, I simply mean families that are optimistic when it comes to economic 
life, and more specifically optimistic that the quality of life for younger genera-
tions is going to keep improving. This gives individuals a psychological incentive 
to work hard—that is, because by working hard, and making short-term sacrifices, 
they assume that things can and will get better financially: that progress can be 
made. Moreover, they collectively want things to get better because they assume or 
hope (at least at the level of the collective) that this will be a good thing—that is, 
that more wealth will, indeed, bring them a better quality of life and—in general 
terms—more happiness overall. A declining family, by contrast, is one that has to 
some extent given up on this desire to pursue wealth per se as a route to happiness, 
as I will elaborate below. 
* * *
So what does a progressive family actually look like? From my fieldwork over the 
years, I could cite many examples. For instance, there is the Chen family, who live 
in the rural Taiwanese town of South Bridge.7 The husband and wife at the head of 
this family grew up in relative poverty, and received basic levels of schooling. After 
marriage, they both worked hard at various jobs before eventually setting up their 
own small business in a market stall. They made a decent amount of money from 
this and lived frugally in the countryside. As a result, they were able to save, to in-
vest, and eventually to provide their only son with a first-rate university education 
in law. At the time of my initial fieldwork, he was just starting out on his profession-
al career. By Taiwanese standards, this family would not have counted as wealthy 
by any means, but things were getting better. And, I might add, they seemed very 
happy. Why? In terms of Layard’s happiness criteria (cited above), the Chens ap-
peared to be set: the marital/family relationships were solid, they had many friends, 
they had reasonably secure and nonstressful employment (which, moreover, they 
seemed to enjoy), their health was good, and they were religious. Furthermore, the 
narrative arc of their lives was basically an optimistic and, again, “progressive” one. 
Mrs. Chen’s health, which used to be problematic, had improved. They had always 
been religious, to some extent, but had become even more so, having found a cult 
to which they were deeply devoted and which (they said) brought them true peace 
of mind. They had an only son who was obedient and loyal, and whose advancing 
basically “Chinese will work hard when they see possible long-term benefits, in terms 
of improved material conditions and/or security, for a group with which they identify” 
(1985: 217). When this is lacking, the reality is that they often don’t work that hard.
7. See Stafford 2006 for a discussion of this family. For the sake of the privacy of my in-
formants, personal and place names, and some other details, have been changed in this 
and all other illustrations. 
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career they followed with pride. My sense is that their concern was not for him to 
succeed, as such: they wanted him to have a good life and to be happy, and assumed 
(i.e., predicted) that some degree of success was a prerequisite for this. Meanwhile, 
his assumption (i.e., prediction) was that his parents would be made happy if he 
were to succeed in school and work, and so he set about doing so. His plan was to 
provide for them in the future even though, in fact, they almost certainly would not 
need any help. The Chens’ main aspiration for him, they told me, was that he would 
end up living nearby. 
This, then, looks like a family in which the intergenerational coordination of 
goals and intentions is smooth, and life is basically headed in a progressive direc-
tion. The parents, by means of steady work, have constructed a future for their 
son that they believe will be in his interests, and the son—also by means of steady 
work—seems determined to make his parents happy by not derailing their imag-
ined future for him (and them). I should add, however, that when I met them there 
were a few cracks in this narrative. The son, although a good student, did not actu-
ally pass the examinations that would have allowed him entry to an especially lu-
crative career. Furthermore, he had shown no signs of getting married (something 
his parents considered essential for a good life), or even of thinking about it any 
time soon. During my fieldwork, there were some tense moments: at one point the 
son stormed off and left for a few days as a way of letting off steam. It could also 
be said that by praising and encouraging his educational successes, his parents had 
risked some of the negative consequences that can follow from this: that is, that 
their son would become burned out by the pressure (cf. Kipnis 2011), that he would 
move further and further away as he became more and more successful (cf. James 
Johnston 2013), and/or that schooling itself would effectively turn him into a dif-
ferent type of person than they themselves were (cf. Stafford 1995). More broadly, 
I would note that the Chens had a rather ambivalent relationship to the ideals of 
Taiwanese capitalism. When I met them, they were classic small entrepreneurs: 
they worked incredibly hard, appeared to enjoy making money, seldom spent much 
of it, and invested their savings carefully. But they prioritized spiritual fulfillment 
over material success, and had passed up opportunities to make more money—in-
cluding, in one case they described to me, out of ethical concern for the impact it 
would have on a fellow villager in a similar business (someone who was not a close 
friend). So although they certainly count as a progressive family in my terms, this 
does not mean that they were unthinkingly and/or unproblematically on the track 
of pursuing wealth as a route to happiness. 
To cite another example, consider the Zhangs from rural northeast China.8 Like 
the Chens, Mr. and Mrs. Zhang (both of whom lost parents during childhood) 
grew up in relative poverty. As children and young adults living during the collec-
tivist era of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, their lives were extremely difficult in many 
respects. Nor were they able to have any children of their own after they married. 
However, Mr. and Mrs. Zhang adopted a daughter, and this daughter eventually 
married a yanglaoxu—that is, a son-in-law who formally agreed to look after the 
Zhangs in old age. (I know little about the background to this match, but bear in 
8. See Stafford 2007 for an extended discussion of this family. Again, personal and place 
names have been changed. 
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mind that it might not have been the adopted daughter’s first choice: as a matter of 
definition, a son-in-law who will agree to care for his parents-in-law, as opposed 
to caring for his own parents, has a low status.) Neither the daughter nor the son-
in-law were highly educated, but they were both working extremely hard when I 
met them, and in the context of China’s post-Mao economic boom they were doing 
rather well for themselves as construction day-laborers in the nearest city. So the 
elder Zhangs had a hard-working daughter and her husband living in their home, 
plus two lovely grandchildren. The future was looking much better than the past, 
and everyone seemed committed to the collective goal of family improvement. 
Again, however, there are a few complications in the narrative arc. In common 
with many other young couples in modern China, the adopted daughter and her 
husband felt a tension between the need to provide for the elder Zhangs and the 
need to provide for their children. To frame this well-known problem in somewhat 
unfamiliar terms: Exactly whom did they want to make happy? Her parents, their 
children, or themselves? Generally speaking, they were investing in the future rath-
er then repaying her adoptive parents for support received, thus leading to family 
tensions. The adopted daughter knew very well that she was not complying fully 
with what her elders wanted, and there was a constant negotiation around this. 
Meanwhile, the fact of their frantic work schedules meant that (in spite of working 
nearby) they were increasingly “leaving their children behind” in the countryside: a 
well-known phenomenon in contemporary China. Was this a reasonable tradeoff: 
that is, pursuing wealth for the whole family’s future while—in effect—leaving the 
children in the village to be raised by others? Would this increase their happiness 
and wellbeing in the long term? Would it lead to the children having a happy/
fulfilled life? Moreover, I would note that the elder Zhangs had a somewhat am-
bivalent relationship to the ideals of China’s socialist market economy, however 
much they may have encouraged their daughter and son-in-law to succeed in it. 
Mr. Zhang was a committed Communist and someone who was seriously troubled 
by the changes he saw around him as market forces intruded on rural life. In short, 
as with the Chen family, the Zhangs were not just unthinkingly or unproblemati-
cally on the track of pursuing wealth as a route to happiness. 
And were they happy? In another article, I have discussed Mr. Zhang’s chron-
ic insomnia and his general anxiety about life, which derives from a number of 
sources (Stafford 2007). Compared to the Chens from Taiwan, he and his wife have 
more concerns about money, their network of friends and relatives is more fragile, 
their health is worse, and (significantly in terms of Layard’s happiness criteria) 
they are not actively religious. But Mr. Zhang would be the first to admit that his 
standard of living is much better now than it was in the past, and that he and his 
wife are fortunate to have ended up with such a hard-working daughter and son-
in-law. I have even heard him, with the help of a small glass of strong northern 
baijiu, become rather at peace with his life, and make glowing statements about 
the good friends, neighbors, and relatives on whom he relies—not to mention the 
Communist Party. 
Of course, the general emotional fulfillment (or otherwise) of the Chens from 
Taiwan and the Zhangs from China is not something that can easily be captured 
in routine ethnographic observations. Their “happiness,” to the extent they have 
it, must be a complex phenomenon: shaped not only by their underlying material 
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circumstances but also by a long list of conflated variables, only a few of which I 
have mentioned. Moreover, their attempts to make money cannot be assumed to 
follow from an explicit theory that wealth will bring happiness. Notably, in many 
cultures/societies, including China, some people work hard because work itself is 
valued—that is, it is not just a way of producing things, or of increasing wealth for 
oneself or for others; it may also be its own kind of “good” (cf. Potter and Potter 
1990: 180–95; Harris 2007).9 Also, as we might predict for families such as the 
Chens and the Zhangs, one of the most compelling motivations for intense eco-
nomic activity is the possibility of slipping back into poverty. The elder Chens and 
Zhangs have an observable retrospective anxiety about their difficult pasts, some-
thing that modulates their optimism about the future. Whatever else they might 
want out of life (spiritual fulfillment, etc.), they certainly want security: both secu-
rity of income, and the security of living in strong families and communities that 
will provide support when difficulties arise.10 But what I primarily want to draw at-
tention to in these examples is the fact of familial optimism, and a preparedness to 
try to succeed, whatever may be the contributing factors to this. In particular, I am 
interested in the outlook of the second generation—that is, of the Chens’ son and 
the Zhangs’ adopted daughter—and in the apparent willingness of this generation 
to study and/or work incredibly hard in order to have, among other things, more 
wealth. And yet, of course, actually having more wealth might be disappointing in 
the end: that is, it might not bring these individuals and their families what they are 
hoping for, and in some cases it might even bring them some things they definitely 
do not want. 
* * *
In order to reflect on this possibility, I now turn to a different fieldwork setting, in 
southwest China near the Burmese border. From my research there in the commu-
nity of Protected Mountain, I could provide examples of progressive families whose 
situations are not unlike those of the Zhangs or the Chens.11 But what is especially 
9. As Harris notes, work is conceived of differently in different times and places, and its 
value is not necessarily linked to material rewards. The conceptualization of work/la-
bor may entail the “celebration of human energy, creativity, and [the] capacity to make 
and expand relationships through work”. For example, in the particular Andean case 
that Harris addresses in her paper, “work is sacralised, seen as an obligation, both be-
cause it is part of a continuous mutual nurturance between humans and deities, and 
because rights to land are articulated through collective work” (Harris 2007: 148). For 
their part, Potter and Potter (1990) stress the role of work as one of the most important 
ways of expressing emotion in Chinese culture.
10. Interestingly, as incomes have gone up in rural China, so too has expenditure on the 
rituals of gift exchange and reciprocity, which, in effect, produce and sustain related-
ness and networks of social support (Yan 1996; Stafford 2000). Although this expen-
diture on reciprocity could be interpreted as “consumption” (consisting as it does of 
expenditure on banqueting, gift giving, gambling, etc.), most ordinary people, in my 
experience, see it as akin to buying insurance: it is a protection against the effects of 
things going wrong in the future. 
11. See Stafford 2004 for a discussion of two cases from this fieldsite. 
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interesting about Protected Mountain is its long narrative of economic rise and fall. 
Briefly, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, local people went to Burma 
as laborers, and not a few of them eventually accumulated wealth as traders. Many 
of the more successful “sojourners” later returned to Protected Mountain to build 
beautiful courtyard houses in which to retire. However, history soon intervened. 
The Japanese occupation dramatically interrupted the Burma trade routes, and 
after the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, the border was eventually 
shut down altogether. After 1949, the explicitly Confucian orientation of Protected 
Mountain created problems for local people, and during the Cultural Revolution 
the beautiful traditional detailing of many of the old houses and buildings was ei-
ther destroyed or hidden behind mud. Today, things have improved. But there is 
still an air of decline about the place, a sense that things were better in the past than 
they will ever be again. 
Given the circumstances, the fall of the grand families of Protected Mountain 
must be seen as a historical phenomenon, and as something brought by outside 
and largely uncontrollable forces: the Japanese occupation, the Chinese civil war, 
Maoist antitraditionalism, and so on. From this perspective, it’s not that the fami-
lies (or the individuals in them) lost the will or motivation to work hard in an at-
tempt to succeed and improve themselves, or that they lost faith in progress and the 
advantages of wealth; it’s more that they had the misfortune to exist at a particular 
historical moment when everything conspired against them—no matter how hard 
they tried. But the decline of such families is also, in some cases, portrayed as an 
internal phenomenon, and perhaps even as something that naturally happens to 
families once a certain degree of wealth has been achieved. This may, in turn, set 
up tensions inside families as hopes and aspirations stop being coordinated across 
generations, for example as children become disenchanted with the actual state of 
living with plenty. 
In considering the phenomenon of “declining” families in Protected Mountain, 
however, I need to draw attention to two variants, both of which can be found 
there. On the one hand, people who accumulate wealth may positively decide to 
turn their efforts to higher things, and perhaps give up the chase for money along 
the way. Note also that this might be coordinated across generations: for example, 
a father could decide, having made money, that his children deserve something 
better than mere money making, and he could push them away from it. This could, 
in turn, be based on his assumptions about what will give them a good life, and 
what will make them happy and/or fulfilled. In the case of Protected Mountain, 
which, as noted above, was explicitly Confucian in outlook, the higher things in 
question were primarily scholarly and artistic. Drawing on the tradition of valuing 
“learning” (xuewen) over commerce, some families—at least as they tell the story 
today—began to invest their wealth in education; to cite the Chinese idiom, they 
“attained Confucianism by way of doing business” (you shang er ru). Obviously, a 
good deal more could be said about this phenomenon. Using the critical terminol-
ogy of Pierre Bourdieu, one might say that these families grew to value the symbolic 
capital of learning more than the merely economic capital of wealth—thus investing 
the latter in accumulating the former. And in some cases, as Bourdieu would pre-
dict, the accumulation of “culture” actually turned out to be a good basis for mak-
ing yet more money in the future. This analytical framing partly echoes Veblen’s 
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stinging critique of the “leisure class” in human history ([1899] 1984). In brief, he 
claims that not working, while applying oneself to noble but ultimately unproduc-
tive pursuits, is just another way of competing for status within society. Conspicu-
ous consumption and conspicuous leisure—however nobly construed—are signs 
of unproductive decadence, and of the human desire to be seen to be better than 
others, regardless of the ultimate (personal or social) cost. 
Veblen notwithstanding, the turn toward culture was largely construed in posi-
tive terms by people in Protected Mountain, as I have already said. But there are 
also instances in which the lack of focus on wealth production was seen negative-
ly—not as a moral renunciation of money chasing but rather as an immoral descent 
into laziness and/or decay. This, then, is the second variant of a declining family. 
To borrow the economists’ way of putting things, the sons and daughters of the 
rich (including those in Protected Mountain) sometimes decide to allocate more of 
their time to, for example, gambling and drinking and vice in general than to wealth 
production—perhaps in part because of their disillusionment with having had it. 
Or instead of pursuing proper Confucian learning, while upholding and enhancing 
family virtue, they might involve themselves in decadent artistic pursuits, or just do 
nothing at all. They may want to spend without earning, no matter what the conse-
quences. Somewhere along the way, they seem to have lost the incentive—wherever 
it came from—to work hard for the sake of increasing family wealth. To frame this 
in relation to emotion and affective forecasting: they have given up striving to get 
what other people (e.g., their elders) want them to want, perhaps in the pursuit of 
what might seem (e.g., from the vantage point of their elders) selfish indulgence. 
But what does a declining family actually look like in contemporary China and 
Taiwan? In Shanghai, Taipei, and other cities, there is now conspicuous consump-
tion on an industrial scale, of course, and the rise of a generation gap between ap-
parently hedonistic young people and their elders. In the rural places where I have 
carried out fieldwork, such tendencies have not been so obvious, in part because 
the families I worked with were mostly living on relatively low incomes. But the 
tendencies do still exist, albeit in modified form, the key point being that these are 
generally cases not of wealthy families turning away from wealth but rather of or-
dinary rural families finding their progressive narrative going off track. One com-
mon issue, for example, is the existence of problem gamblers or drinkers or drug 
takers, or those who end up spending more than they should on household goods 
or other things simply in order to show off. Predictably, hard-working elders are 
bitterly disappointed to find themselves with descendants who seem determined 
to destroy their progressive economic narrative. In some circumstances, this is bad 
enough to bring a family into serious decline, as in the case of one younger couple 
I met during fieldwork in northeast China who were at risk of financial destruction 
thanks to the husband’s gambling problem. Interestingly, his daughter, still a young 
child, had a progressive attitude—instilled through a combination of her mother’s 
influence and the influence of her schoolteachers—and she was harshly critical of 
her father for the chronic gambling that was, in her view, harming her family. I do 
not have enough evidence to know for sure, but I would guess that his behavior 
was partly a function of bitterness and cynicism concerning his own life prospects: 
What hope was there that a poor guy from rural China would ever make serious 
money in such a corrupt system? His rejection of the chase after money, his descent 
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into drinking and, in particular, gambling, was thus very different from that of elite 
Protected Mountain families who, in the past, decided to focus their time and en-
ergy on calligraphic skills. 
In any case, the kind of familial “decline” or “decadence” I have observed dur-
ing fieldwork has more often been of a relatively low-key and subtle kind: that is, 
neither a turning to higher things nor a cynical rejection of life as it is. For example, 
the first family I lived with in rural Taiwan, the Lins, were among the wealthiest in 
the township (although, in Taiwanese terms, not unusually so). Mr. and Mrs. Lin 
lived with their three children in a large house facing the ocean, and spent more 
than most local people on food, entertainment, travel, and so on. Their wealth 
derived from hard—sometimes truly backbreaking—work in construction. At the 
time of my fieldwork, however, I spotted a tension, diffuse but observable, between 
the outlook of the parents and that of the children. In brief, the children (still young 
at the time) were inclined to avoid schoolwork or chores wherever possible, and 
to be a little self-indulgent, for example to eat as many sweets as they could. The 
parents did not like, and wished to change, these attitudes, and so there were many 
fights about it being time to study, and so on. I also sometimes felt that I observed 
in the children a mild—and largely inchoate—contempt for their hard-working 
parents, who were so obviously of rural Taiwanese stock. The children, products 
of high-quality “modern” schooling as much as of family life, spent most of their 
free time watching television programs about urban elites and seemed on track to 
be more sophisticated and “advanced” than their own parents … and possibly also 
much less hard working. One irony about this, already alluded to above, is that the 
advancement/sophistication of these children—which is precisely what most par-
ents aspire to for their offspring (and certainly it is what they help pay for)—is also 
something that arguably turns them into fundamentally different kinds of persons 
than their parents (Stafford 1995). It was hard to picture these Taiwanese children 
eventually working, as their parents sometimes did, in muddy construction sites 
day and night. Were they themselves aiming for higher things? Did their parents 
assume that by providing comforts to their children, of one kind or another, they 
would be making them happy? 
Notably, questions of these kinds could also be asked in relation to the Chens 
and the Zhangs, that is, in relation to the progressive families I have mentioned 
above. Might the Chens’ son become, via education, more interested in pursuing 
art than in pursuing law? Might that path somehow lead him to abandon his (gen-
erally) Confucian outlook, his willingness to work hard just to please his parents? 
Might the ambitiousness of the Zhangs’ daughter-in-law get the best of her, leading 
her to neglect the happiness not only of her adoptive parents but also of her own 
children? Through various experiences and interactions in the city, might she and 
her husband, at some point, lose their willingness to sacrifice so much for a com-
mon family purpose? 
* * *
At this stage, let me briefly recapitulate the discussion so far. Some economists 
and psychologists argue that, beyond a certain level of income, wealth does not 
make us happy. The difficulty is that we sometimes behave as if it will make us 
happy—a potentially disastrous case of affective mis-forecasting. Of course, there is 
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significant variation in definitions and valuations of happiness across cultures, and 
in the case of China and Taiwan the significance of happiness (and of emotional 
life in general) has changed over time. Furthermore, when we look at examples of 
real Chinese and Taiwanese families, we are reminded not only that happiness is a 
complex psychological phenomenon, but also that the link between the willingness 
to work and the desire for wealth and/or happiness, as such, is not always obvious. 
One complication is that people are motivated not only by what they want but also 
often—and sometimes more importantly—by what the people around them want. 
In what I have called progressive families (such as the Chens and the Zhangs), the 
second generation does seem very highly motivated to work in order to have an 
improved life. This may be partly, even largely, because they are responding to their 
own assumptions/predictions about what will make older generations happy. And 
the older generations may be pushing them because of their assumptions/predic-
tions about what will make younger generations happy. I have drawn a contrast 
between this and the situation in declining families, where the younger generations 
appear to be losing—or even actively resisting—the motivation for work and, per-
haps, the general belief in progress. There are different scenarios for this, but some 
such people may come across as lazy, or self-indulgent. In terms of China’s cultural 
tradition, they may also come across as strikingly individualistic in orientation, that 
is, as focused on their own happiness, pleasure, or utility rather than on family 
goals and family progress. The affective forecasting they care about, one might say, 
is of the purely personal kind rather than being intergenerational. 
In his Malinowski Lecture for 2003, Yunxiang Yan explored this issue with ref-
erence to material from long-term fieldwork in Heilongjiang (Yan 2005). What 
he describes, however, is not a situation in which people are giving up on prog-
ress or rejecting material comfort. On the contrary, Yan describes a situation in 
which young people in the countryside appear to be chasing utility—basically in 
the form of money and material goods—at all costs. Among other things, some 
of them attempt to extract maximum bridewealth from their elders for their own 
personal benefit. They justify this partly on pragmatic grounds, but also with refer-
ence to a rather dimly comprehended, and deeply utilitarian, notion of “Western 
individualism.”12 This is not something that Yan finds it in himself to like, but he 
does clearly show some of the complex motivations behind the (individualistic and 
seemingly unfilial) actions of the young people he met during fieldwork. As he 
explains, they are motivated not just by a desire to be happy, but also by a grow-
ing sense that personal happiness and success is something they actually deserve. 
While this can be seen as selfish, some people in the local community do admire 
young women and men for the strength of character they show in standing up to 
elders and extracting what they need, or think they need, in order to face the future 
(Yan 2005: 644). 
By contrast, who has a good word to say for the truly decadent? That is, 
who has a good word to say for young people who, unlike their parents, are not 
12. Yan suggests that while Western individualism is normally assumed to centrally involve 
elements both of self-reliance and of duty to others, the version adopted by his infor-
mants in Heilongjiang is premised on a good deal of reliance on others (especially one’s 
parents and siblings), and very limited duties. 
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prepared to work hard in order to improve their standard of living? For those 
who turn their backs altogether on the idea of wealth or financial security as the 
ultimate value? It is worth noting, again, that “decadent” young people of this 
kind might, in fact, be possessed of a kind of worldly wisdom. That is, having 
grown up in relative affluence—or at least in the absence of poverty—some of 
them may no longer believe that having money, as such, is a guarantee of hap-
piness or fulfillment. Having observed the lives of the relatively affluent people 
around them, they may have decided that “progress” is not what they want or ex-
pect from their brief existences. What some would interpret as a lack of morality 
could therefore well be seen as a consistent (if arguably decadent, and potentially 
radical) ethical stance. 
Interestingly, this stance also has a scientific basis, if one believes the recent 
findings of economists about happiness and wellbeing in post-Mao China. Here 
the evidence suggests that, “paradoxically,” the huge increase in wealth has not pro-
duced a growth in happiness—that is, in spite of the fact that the uplift from rela-
tively low levels of income should normally have done so. (In other words, this is 
not a case of a rich country getting richer.) As Richard Easterlin and his colleagues 
succinctly put it: “There is no evidence of an increase in life satisfaction [in China] 
of the magnitude that might have been expected to result from the fourfold im-
provement in the level of per capita consumption that has occurred”—in fact, there 
is probably a decline in life satisfaction, some would say a very steep one (Easterlin 
et al. 2012: 9775; for background see also Easterlin 2008 and Easterlin et al. 2010). 
And why should this be? The most plausible explanation, it seems, is that in spite of 
rising incomes, people have been made unhappy by a rise in unemployment, by the 
dissolution of China’s (formerly strong) social safety net, by rising material aspira-
tions (which, in effect, can never be satisfied), and by growing economic inequality 
(Easterlin et al. 2012; see also Brockmann et al. 2008). Note that although the case 
she discusses is radically different in many of its particulars, the article by Freeman 
on the Gamo people of Ethiopia (this collection) has definite resonances with the 
Chinese experience: for example, they seem to be made unhappy by rising inequal-
ity. Even for relatively poor people, then, it seems that money is not the route to 
happiness in all circumstances.
* * *
Of course, the idea that “money does not make you happy” is an element in folk 
philosophies in many parts of the world, along with the notion that moral perils 
attach to economic activity in general (Parry and Bloch 1989). In contemporary 
China, one certainly encounters nostalgia for the Maoist era, when wealth was 
trumped by higher (collectivist) values, and a regret that today all of social life 
appears to have been reduced to a chase after money. However, this has to be set 
against the overwhelming evidence of what people actually prioritize in their own 
actions—that is, the pursuit of wealth—and the countervailing folk philosophies 
which encourage them to do so. The proportion of people in China and Taiwan 
who truly opt out of chasing money, as things stand, is surely very small. One rea-
son for this is that every individual is a locus of affective predictions (reliable or 
not); to seriously challenge such predictions, for example by adopting a life-course 
that loved ones see as doomed to failure, is not an easy task. 
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The economist John Kenneth Galbraith, while not exactly extolling the virtues 
of decadence, as such, has put in a good word for idleness. As Veblen explained back 
in the late nineteenth century, idleness is sometimes simply another “good” which 
is there to impress others—especially those who still have to work for a living. But 
in a book which interestingly prefigures the conclusions of Richard Layard, and 
written almost half a century earlier, Galbraith argues (with considerably less cyni-
cism than Veblen) that the modern capitalist system is built to address problems 
which are simply no longer relevant for those of us living in developed, affluent 
societies (Galbraith [1958] 1999). Everything is still oriented toward the produc-
tion of goods, whereas in fact the last thing we need in the affluent world is more 
material goods. Like Layard, Galbraith thinks that sorting out inequality, unhappi-
ness, and so on, would be a nobler goal than increasing productivity and generating 
wealth.13 So why should we still find the failure to be productive so offensive? Why 
do we condemn it? As he observes: “The idle man may still be an enemy of himself. 
But it is hard to say that the loss of his effort is damaging to society” (ibid.: 215). 
An argument of this kind, not to mention a fully fledged defense of decadence, 
will probably not find much purchase in the China of today, nor in Taiwan. But 
as these societies become increasingly affluent, it seems inevitable that more and 
more people will find themselves working hard in the pursuit of money that is not, 
in fact, making them any happier. At least a few of them are bound to catch on. 
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Mieux vaut songer deux fois à ses souhaits: Le cas du bonheur en Chine
Résumé : Cet article rapproche des matériaux ethnographiques de Chine rurale 
et de Taiwan des théories et de découvertes récentes sur la psychologie et l’écono-
mie du bonheur. Selon ces recherches, les psychologues suggèrent que les humains 
ne sont pas très compétents en matières de “prévisions affectives”, ou en d’autres 
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termes, que nous anticipons mal nos émotions. Cela peut porter à conséquence, par 
exemple lorsque des humains cherchent à gagner de l’argent pour être heureux sans 
réaliser qu’avoir de l’argent ne les rendra en fait probablement pas plus heureux. 
En m’appuyant sur des données ethnographiques, je suggère que les personnes qui 
habitent en Chine et a Taiwan s’intéressent autant à la prediction des émotions des 
autres qu’à la prédiction des leurs. Dans cette perspective, je présente des projets 
familiaux chinois où la poursuite de richesses - “pour le bonheur familial” - semble 
être un but partagé, ainsi que d’autres exemples de familles où ce projet partagé 
semble s’être perdu.
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